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Introduction  
On the evening of Saturday, August 8, 1846, a sweltering night in which “newspaper fans 
and ice water were in great demand,” a first-term Democratic congressman from 
Pennsylvania took to the House floor to address his colleagues.1  Earlier that day, 
President James K. Polk had sent a message to Congress requesting two million dollars to 
be used to negotiate a peace settlement with Mexico, with whom the U.S. had been at war 
for several months. Since its inception, Polk had assured Congress and the nation that the 
war was strictly defensive and had denied that it was being waged in the interest of 
territorial expansion. The appropriation request, however, now made it clear that the 
administration desired to make the acquisition of Mexican land part of any potential 
peace agreement.2 The timing of the request was an opportunistic move on Polk’s part. 
By waiting until the last weekend of the congressional session, which was set to adjourn 
at noon on Monday, August 10, he had likely hoped to bypass any serious debate that 
might forestall his acquisition scheme. Things, however, did not go according to plan.  
 After a two million dollar appropriation bill was drawn up, the debate in the 
House began. Several members addressed the proposed bill – including Hugh White, a 
Whig from New York who denounced the war as “unnecessary, uncalled for, and wholly 
unjustifiable” before calling on the  “the other side of the House” to offer, as an act of 
good faith, an amendment prohibiting the extension of slavery – before David Wilmot 
was recognized by the Speaker.3 Wilmot began by reaffirming his support for the war as 
																																								 																				
1 New York Herald, August 11, 1846. 
2 According to Eric Foner, “Polk recognized that a peace treaty ceding land to the United States would be 
unpopular in Mexico. He intended to use the two million dollars as payment to the Mexican government. 
This would enable it to retain the support of the Mexican army and, therefore, to stay in power. Foner, “The 
Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Sept., 1969): 273. 
3 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 1213-1214. 
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necessary and proper and by denying that it was a war of conquest.  He admitted, 
however, that it was now apparent that the President sought to acquire territory from 
Mexico, which Wilmot would not oppose as long as it was fairly attained by purchase or 
negotiation, and not by conquest. “But whatever territory might be acquired, he declared 
himself opposed, now and forever, to the extension of this ‘peculiar institution’ that 
belongs to the South.”4 Wilmot concluded by offering the following amendment, 
modelled on Jefferson’s Northwest Ordinance, which afterwards became known as the 
“Wilmot Proviso”: 
 
Provided, That as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any 
territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty 
which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the 
moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery not involuntary servitude shall ever 
exist in any part of said territory, except for a crime, whereof the party shall first 
be duly convicted.5 
 
The amended bill passed the House along strictly sectional lines, although it was 
subsequently killed in the Senate.6 While it drew little attention at the time, and though it 
never did manage to pass the Senate, the Wilmot Proviso had a tremendous impact on the 
course of American history. The controversy that followed its introduction unleashed a 
sectional struggle that ultimately lead to a civil war which nearly tore the Union apart. 
While historians have universally recognized the significance of the Proviso, they 
have focused almost exclusively on the political motivations behind its introduction and 
the political ramifications that followed, rather than on the essential role played by the 
American people in bringing it about. Although the handful of Van Buren Democrats 
																																								 																				
4 Ibid., 1214.  
5 Ibid., 1217. 
6 The bill was talked to death (inadvertently, he later claimed) by Whig John Davis of Massachusetts. 	
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behind the Proviso were certainly motivated by political considerations, without popular 
pressure from large segments of the electorate, they would not have had the need to 
respond in the first place.7 For the truth is, in various sections of the Northeast and 
Midwest, the Mexican War was widely and vehemently opposed from the start, primarily 
because of its alleged association with the extension of slavery. For their part in 
supporting this decidedly unpopular war, the Proviso men faced the serious prospect of 
defeat in the upcoming elections of 1846. As members of the dominant party, these 
Democrats were bound to support the war, yet some gesture was required to assure their 
antiwar constituents that the war was not being waged to spread slavery; the Proviso was 
intended to do just that. The introduction of the Proviso, therefore, was in no small part 
the result of popular outrage and activism on the part of antislavery opponents of the war. 
By characterizing the Proviso as the product of self-serving politicians exclusively, 
historians have overlooked the agency and influence of thousands of antiwar activists 
who collectively forced these men to act.  
Although there may be general consensus among historians regarding its impact, 
there remains some controversy surrounding the origins of, and motivations behind, the 
Wilmot Proviso. In fact, historians even disagree about the original authorship of the 
amendment. For many years, historians accepted the version told by Congressman Jacob 
Brinkerhoff of Ohio, who insisted that he was the true author of the famous amendment. 
However, because of his own reputation as an antislavery man, Brinkerhoff claimed that 
he approached Wilmot, who had until then been a loyal supporter of the administration 
and had shown no sign of antislavery sympathies, to introduce the measure instead. 
Although Brinkerhoff had acted independently, after conferring with some Democratic 
																																								 																				
7 Van Buren Democrats, or Van Burenites, were northern followers of former President Martin Van Buren. 
	4 
	
colleagues he discovered that several others had written amendments similar in character 
to his own.8 As Brinkerhoff later admitted, “I am entitled to no very great and no 
exclusive credit. My draft of the Proviso happened to be adopted as the best, and that is 
all.”9 
Wilmot, on the other hand, claimed that he alone had conceived of the idea during 
the dinner recess, but admitted to afterwards consulting with several fellow Democrats 
who also favored such an amendment. Therefore, when the appropriation bill was 
introduced in the evening session, “several gentlemen collected together to agree upon 
the form and terms of the proposed [free-soil] amendment. . . . After various drafts had 
been drawn and altered, the language in which the amendment was offered was finally 
agreed on.”10 Charles Buxton Going accepted this version of events in his 1924 
biography of Wilmot, and even managed to track down the “original” Proviso submitted 
to the Speaker on August, 8, 1846 in Wilmot’s handwriting.11 Following this revelation, 
most historians have accepted Going’s conclusion that Wilmot, not Brinkerhoff, was the 
Proviso’s true author.12  
																																								 																				
8 Charles Eugene Hamlin, The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1899), 155-57. In the Brinkerhoff account, this group included Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, John P. Hale of 
New Hampshire, Preston King, George Rathbun, Martin Grover, and Timothy Jenkins of New York, and 
Paul Dillingham of Vermont. Although, according to Foner, “Hale’s inclusion seems to be an error. He was 
not a member of the 29th Congress. Brinkerhoff was probably thinking of Hale’s role in the 28th Congress, 
when he opposed the annexation of Texas.” Foner, “Wilmot Proviso,” 262. 
9 Quoted in Charles Buxton Going, David Wilmot, Free-Soiler: A Biography of the Great Advocate of the 
Wilmot Proviso. (Gloucester, Mass: P. Smith, 1966), 139. 
10 Wilmot’s account comes from a speech he delivered in Albany, NY on October 29, 1847; published in 
The voice of New York! Proceedings of the Herkimer mass convention of Oct. 26, 1847, with the Speeches 
of the Hon. David Wilmot of Pa.; C.C. Cambreleng, John Van Buren, and others (Albany: Albany Atlas, 
1847), 12. The members of the group mentioned by Wilmot included five of the same men listed by 
Brinkerhoff (Rathbun, King, Grover, Hamlin, and Brinkerhoff), as well as James Thompson of 
Pennsylvania. 
11 Going, David Wilmot, 122-23. 
12 Foner, “Wilmot Proviso,” 264. 
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So who, then, was the actual author of the Proviso? As Eric Foner concedes, “The 
question of who ‘really’ authored the Proviso is a difficult one, and it is probably 
unanswerable. In a sense, it is also irrelevant. . . . It is easy to understand how, as 
Brinkerhoff and Wilmot brought their ideas to their friends and the exact wording was 
hammered out, each of several congressmen could have come away with the impression 
that he had made the decisive contribution.”13 And as Charles Eugene Hamlin previously 
observed, based on Brinkerhoff’s own admission, “The idea of excluding slavery from 
the territory to be conquered from Mexico had occurred to many anti-slavery members of 
Congress. . . . In the incident that then occurred, there were several men who took part, 
each of whom might have said afterwards that he had a narrow escape from lasting 
fame.”14  The amendment, it is therefore fair to say, was not the creation of any single 
author but instead the result of a collaboration between several northern Democrats. 
As for the motives behind the Wilmot Proviso, they too have been widely 
contested by historians.15 However, Foner’s assessment of the Proviso in his influential 
1969 article, “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” has been the most convincing one yet. 
Foner contends that the amendment was not the creation of any single author but rather 
the work of several antislavery Democrats, all belonging to the wing of the party headed 
by former President Martin Van Buren. Furthermore, of the Democrats whom Wilmot or 
Brinkerhoff claimed to have consulted, four were from New York State, including the 
																																								 																				
13 Ibid., 264 
14 Hamlin, Hannibal Hamlin, 155-56. 
15 The various theories, of course, are contingent upon the version of authorship accepted by each historian. 
For the most influential arguments about the Proviso’s origins see, in addition to Hamlin, Going, and 
Foner, Clark E. Persinger, “The ‘Bargain of 1844’ as the Origin of the Wilmot Proviso,” The Quarterly of 
the Oregon Historical Society, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept., 1914); Richard R. Stenberg, “The Motivation behind 
the Wilmot Proviso,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (March, 1932); Avery 
Craven, The Coming of the Civil War, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); and Chaplain 
W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1967).  
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leader of the Van Buren faction in Congress, Preston King. As Foner acknowledges, “It is 
hard to resist the conclusion that the New York Van Burenites, and especially King, were 
the leading spirits of the group. . . . Indeed, if Wilmot was a ‘front man,’ he may well 
have acted for King. . . . But it was King, not Wilmot, who introduced the Proviso in the 
next session of Congress and demonstrated the close connection of the New York Van 
Burenites with the measure.”16 
According to Foner, the Proviso was essentially a reaction to “southern 
Democrats who were violating the traditional party politics of keeping slavery out of 
national politics and were asking their northern allies to endorse proslavery measures – 
even though this would alienate a growing segment of northern public opinion.”17 For 
decades, the national Democratic Party was held together by a coalition of northern 
supporters of Van Buren and pro-slavery southerners. By the 1840s, however, party 
harmony was increasingly threatened by the toxic issue of slavery, which the traditional 
party leadership had long tried to keep out of national politics. According to Foner, “as 
the controversy over the gag rule and the emergence of the Liberty party injected slavery 
into the political life of the North, Van Buren and his followers began to fear that their 
‘southern principles’ were becoming a political liability.”18 This was especially true after 
the annexation of Texas and the outbreak of the Mexican War, which many northerners 
associated with the extension of slavery. Therefore, when the president made his request 
for the two million dollars, the Proviso was introduced by the Van Buren clique in order 
to appease antislavery constituents in their home districts by assuring them that the war 
was not being waged to spread slavery. As he concludes, “It was a defensive, not an 
																																								 																				
16 Foner, “Wilmot Proviso,” 264-65. 
17 Ibid., 265-66. 
18 Ibid., 266. 
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aggressive movement, an attempt by the Van Burenites to protect themselves in the face 
of growing antislavery sentiment in their constituencies. The Van Burenites were 
determined for once to be on the popular side of the slavery issue in the North”19  
Although Foner’s theory, in part, helps explain the origins of the Proviso, it is 
nonetheless incomplete because it fails to answer some crucial questions related to the 
Proviso. For instance, why did the Proviso men need to assure their constituents that the 
Mexican War was not being waged to spread slavery? How did they know that their 
constituents distrusted the objects of the war? After all, they couldn’t read the minds of 
their constituents. Apart from alluding to the existence of antislavery sentiment in their 
districts, Foner never really does say. The short answer, in fact, is that from the start, the 
war was widely and actively contested in various sections of the Northeast and upper 
Midwest, including the districts represented by the Proviso men. In these parts, 
abolitionists, pacifists, and Whig oppositionists strongly denounced the war and loudly 
agitated for its immediate conclusion. Although the war was disputed for different 
reasons, it was primarily condemned because of its alleged association with the “Slave 
Power” and the extension of slavery.20 In short, to be antiwar did not necessarily mean to 
be antislavery; however, to be antislavery meant, almost without exception, to be antiwar. 
																																								 																				
19 Ibid., 278. Note: While Foner’s argument is quite compelling, there is nothing particularly original about. 
In fact, William Jay, the son of Chief Justice John Jay, made the very same argument in his 1849 study, A 
Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co., 1849), 
which was one of the first histories of the conflict. Foner does not cite Jay’s work. 
20 The Slave Power was allegedly a conspiratorial group of powerful slaveholders who were determined to 
use the federal government to protect and perpetuate slavery at all costs. This term is conspicuously 
missing from Foner’s study of the Proviso; although, he has written extensively on it elsewhere. See, for 
instance, Foner’s book Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), in 
which he examines the Slave Power thesis as fundamental to the political ideology of the early Republican 
Party. In addition to antislavery considerations, people opposed the war because it was viewed as an 
aggressive war of conquest, because it was considered unconstitutional, because of pacifism and other 
religious convictions, out of concern that it would have a militarizing effect on the Republic, because of the 
substantial financial and material costs of waging war, etc. It should be noted that none of these reasons for 
opposing the war were mutually exclusive.  
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The antislavery bloc was by far the most prominent force within the antiwar movement, 
as well as the one most concerning to the Van Burenites representing antislavery districts. 
Because of their well-deserved reputations as “doughfaces” – northern politicians 
who supported southern policies – the Van Burenites were especially vulnerable to the 
charge of colluding with southern slaveholders to spread the “peculiar institution” 
through the conquest of Mexico. While he correctly, though perhaps rather reductively, 
attributes the Proviso to the growth of antislavery sentiment in the North, which in turn 
threatened Democratic success at the polls, Foner fails to recognize, or even explore, a 
potential link between an organized antiwar movement and the origins of the Proviso. 
Indeed, nowhere in his article does he even allude to the existence of popular opposition 
to the war, or for that matter, the corresponding, widely held belief in the Slave Power 
conspiracy. By attributing the Proviso exclusively to a handful of politicians, Foner has 
ignored the thousands of nameless peace activists who pressured them into taking action. 
This is a significant omission that must corrected in order to fully comprehend the 
motives behind the Wilmot Proviso.   
Unfortunately, Foner’s neglect of the antiwar movement is not unique. Indeed, 
with a few exceptions, even historians of the Mexican War have marginalized the antiwar 
movement and overlooked its impact on national politics. In fact, John H. Schroeder’s 
Mr. Polk’s War, published in 1973, remains the only monograph to study the antiwar 
movement in detail.21 Although, he too fails to acknowledge any connection between the 
movement and the Proviso. Amy S. Greenberg’s A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and 
the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico, published in 2012, is one of the few general histories 
																																								 																				
21 John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk’s War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1973). 
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of the conflict to pay serious attention to the antiwar movement.22 However, Greenberg 
also overlooks the role that peace activists played in bringing about the Wilmot Proviso, 
which receives barely a mention in her account.  
The truth is that the antiwar movement played a crucial role in bringing about the 
introduction of the Wilmot Proviso. When the war with Mexico was commenced in 1846, 
it was widely and vehemently attacked as a plot authored by the Slave Power and 
supported by complicit northern Democrats to acquire more slave territory. As members 
of the dominant party, the Proviso men were bound to support the war, yet some gesture 
was required to reassure their antiwar constituents that the war was not being waged to 
spread slavery. Thus, the Proviso was an attempt by the Van Buren men to distance 
themselves from the Slave Power charge, shed their doughface reputations, and prove 
that they were not beholden to the southern wing of the party. The introduction of the 
Proviso, therefore, was in no small part the result of popular outrage and activism on the 
part of antislavery opponents of the war. In other words, it is fair to consider the Proviso 
a response to, and a concession won by, antiwar activists. For this reason, and regardless 
of its ultimate failure to end the war at its inception, the antiwar movement was in fact 
much more influential in shaping national debate and had a much greater impact on 
national politics than the existing historiography acknowledges. This essay sheds new 
light on a crucial chapter in United States history by focusing overdue attention on the 
previously overlooked, but very meaningful contributions of the antiwar movement. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
22 Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New 
York: Vintage, 2012). 
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I. The Slave Power Thesis and Doughface Democrats 
In order to understand the impetus of antislavery opponents of the Mexican War, and 
therefore the origins of the Proviso, it is necessary to examine the idea of the Slave 
Power. By the 1840s, coinciding with the growth of abolitionism and the emergence of 
the Liberty Party, the Slave Power thesis was gaining popular acceptance throughout 
much of the North. This theory maintained that a conspiratorial Slave Power, comprised 
of powerful self-serving slaveholders, “had seized control of the federal government and 
was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes.”23 It was believed that 
because of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution, the electoral college system, parity 
in the Senate, and disciplined regional unity, “slave oligarchs” had acquired a 
disproportionate amount of power within (or rather, over) the federal government. 
According to the Boston Courier, in a typical example, “A planter in Virginia, owning 
fifty slaves, has a power in the election of President and representatives in Congress, 
equivalent to thirty votes, while a farmer in Massachusetts, having equal or greater 
property, has only one single vote.” As a result, the free states “are little better than 
colonies; permitted to call themselves members of the Union, and so march in procession, 
to swell the triumph of the Slave Power.”24 With the complicity of northern lackeys, it 
was believed, the Slave Power was using the national government to promote its own 
interests – namely the preservation and expansion of slavery – at the expense of northern 
interests.25 Considering the evidence, it must be admitted that there was indeed much 
truth to this argument. As Leonard Richards rhetorically asks in his seminal work on the 
																																								 																				
23 Foner, Free Soil, 9.	
24 “The Slave Power,” Boston Courier, reprinted in Liberator, April 12, 1844. 
25 The Slave Power thesis was a widely accepted tool of historical explanation from the Civil War era into 
the twentieth century. See, for instance, Henry Wilson’s influential study, History of the Rise and Fall of 
the Slave Power in America, 3 vols. (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1872-1877). 
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subject: “Who won the major sectional showdowns in the nation’s history?” As he points 
out, in the congressional battles over admitting Missouri as a slave state, removing the 
southern tribes from their ancestral homelands in the Southeast, denying abolitionists the 
right to petition, over admitting Texas as a slave state, etc., “it was easy to argue [in each 
case] that the Slave Power prevailed.” And as for who consistently controlled the most 
prominent federal offices – the White House, the Speaker’s chair, the Supreme Court – 
“The answer was that slavemasters had far more power than their numbers warranted.”26 
Whatever their differences on other issues, southern politicians of both parties, it 
was believed, were united in serving the interests of slavery. According to the Rochester 
Freeman, for instance, “their anxiety to protect and perpetuate slavery, renders the 
southern members united in whatever measures they consider important for that purpose, 
while the representatives from the North, having no common bond of union, are divided 
in opinion and effort.”27 Because of the “gentlemen’s agreement” that maintained the 
balance of free and slave states admitted to the Union, the South had representational 
parity in the Senate, however, the more populous North consistently held control of the 
House. Therefore, the Slave Power relied, by necessity, on northern cooperation to push 
its proslavery measures through Congress. Through the distribution of patronage and 
other enticements, the Slave Power attracted the support of northern congressmen, or 
“doughfaces,” as they were called, to vote for southern initiatives. Much more often than 
not, these doughfaces were Democrats, who were thus depicted as sell-outs and lackeys 
by their northern opponents. As Richards puts it, “They were accused of being allies of 
the Slave Power, of complicitly allowing the slave oligarchs to run the nation, of selling 
																																								 																				
26 Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 8-9. I have relied especially on this book in the section below. 
27 “Northern Concessions,” Rochester Freeman, reprinted in Liberator, January 31, 1840.	
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out to their southern colleagues for a few measly positions in the national Democratic 
hierarchy.”28  
For many members of the northern Democracy, especially the New York 
followers of Van Buren, the doughface label was well justified by their voting records. 
Northern Democrats were, in fact, overwhelmingly more likely to vote with the South 
than northern Whigs. In Richards’s estimation, “If a man was elected as a Whig, the 
chances that he would vote with the South in the next sectional crisis were at best one in 
twenty. If he was elected as a Democrat, the odds were one in two.”29 In sum, Richards 
figures, “Between 1820 and 1860, of the 320 congressmen who clearly earned the label 
doughface, all but ten were either Jeffersonian Republicans or Jacksonian Democrats.”30  
Why were northern Democrats, unlike their Whig rivals, so willing to submit to 
southern demands and back proslavery measures? After all, both northern parties had to 
cooperate with the South to win national elections. The difference had much to do with 
the history and structure of the Democratic Party, which originally grew out of a coalition 
established by Van Buren between northern and southern groups prior to the election of 
1828. According to Richards, this Jacksonian coalition was “initially southern based, 
proslavery at heart, with a growing but largely subservient northern wing.”31 In other 
words, northern Democrats were junior partners from the start, and the southern faction 
made every effort to protect its dominant position within the party. For instance, in order 
to enhance their influence, southern Democrats established the two-thirds rule, which 
required a two-thirds majority in the selection of president and vice president at 
																																								 																				
28 Richards, Slave Power, 4. 
29 Ibid., 111. 
30 Ibid., 109-10.  
31 Ibid., 112. 
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nominating conventions. This rule, which began in 1832 and lasted until 1936, essentially 
“gave the South a veto over whomever the northern majority might want for president 
and vice president” and meant that “a well-organized minority [i.e., the southern 
delegates] could derail the candidate of the majority and dictate terms.” The two-thirds 
rule, therefore, forced northern presidential hopefuls to play along with the South or 
suffer the consequences.32 
The party arrangement, however, was not without its advantages to northern 
Democrats, especially those with national aspirations, who profited from the 
organizational support of the nation’s dominant party, as well as its distribution of 
patronage. However, the price of this support often meant delivering northern votes for 
southern policies such as the Indian Removal Act, the ban on abolitionist literature in 
southern mails, and the “gag rule.” Even though these measures were unpopular in the 
North, northern Democrats, especially the New York Van Burenites, consistently voted in 
accord with their southern colleagues. At this time, however, “when slavery played only a 
minor role in northern politics, the political damage done [to northern Democrats] . . . 
was outweighed by the preservation of party unity.”33 But over time, as antislavery 
sentiment grew in the North, threatening Democratic success at the polls, northern 
Democrats would have to reconsider their cozy relationship with the South, as well as 
their voting habits. It is in this context that the Wilmot Proviso must be viewed.  
The gag rule, in particular, offers a useful case study in the changing voting habits 
of the northern Democracy in the years leading up to the Wilmot Proviso. In 1835, the 
American Anti-Slavery Society began to bombard the nation, especially the South, with 
																																								 																				
32 Ibid., 114-15. 
33 Foner, “Wilmot Proviso,” 266.	
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abolitionist pamphlets while simultaneously flooding Congress with thousands of 
antislavery petitions. As the number of petitions grew into the hundreds of thousands, 
southern congressmen began to demand their immediate and total exclusion. The 
eventual outcome of the debate that followed was the establishment of the “gag rule,” 
which “prohibited the House from printing, discussing, or even mentioning the contents 
of any petitions related in any way to the subject of slavery. Such petitions were to be 
‘laid on the table’ with ‘no further action whatever.’”34 While most northern 
congressmen, especially the Whigs, vehemently opposed the resolution, which they 
considered a clear violation of the first amendment to the Constitution, the Van Buren 
men strongly supported it. In fact, only one of the 55 northern Whigs in the House voted 
for the gag, while, conversely, 59 northern Democrats voted for it, and only 15 against it. 
The New York delegation, as usual, lived up to its doughface reputation and led the way 
with 25 members in favor, and only one against the resolution.35  
Throughout the 1830s, the Van Buren men continued overwhelmingly to support 
the gag rule, which required renewal at the start of each new session of Congress. 
However, by 1840, for the first time, more northern Democrats voted against the gag than 
for it, with only seven New York Democrats out of 19 supporting it.36 And by 1844, 
when John Quincy Adams once again called for the repeal of the gag rule (which he had 
repeatedly done since its establishment), not only did northern Democrats refuse to help 
their southern colleagues, but they actually provided the votes necessary to kill the gag 
for good. This time, 79 percent of the northern Democracy sided with Adams, including 
																																								 																				
34 Richards, Slave Power, 132. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 138.	
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18 of the 20 members of the New York delegation.37 This reversal on the part of northern 
Democrats, especially the Van Burenites, was indicative of a larger political trend that 
would carry on into the fight over Texas and culminate with the Wilmot Proviso. 
 
II. The Rise of Antislavery and the Birth of the Liberty Party 
What caused this drastic change in northern Democratic voting habits? In short, the 
reversal was caused by the rise of antislavery and anti-southern sentiments in the North, 
which forced congressmen of both parties, but especially doughface Democrats, to take 
heed. In the coming years, in fact, some of these disenchanted voters would emerge as the 
leading opponents of the Mexican War. During the 1830s, in addition to the traditional 
abolitionist seedbeds of New England, support for the movement was growing in large 
sections of the Northeast and the upper Midwest – especially in the “burned-over district” 
of central New York, the Northern Tier counties of Pennsylvania, and the Western 
Reserve section of Ohio – the very districts later represented by the Proviso men.38 In 
New York, “abolition societies sprung up; the circulation of The Liberator increased; 
and, as a natural consequence, the number of those who sought to promote abolition by 
political action grew larger and larger.”39 In 1836, the American Anti-Slavery Society, 
founded by William Lloyd Garrison and Arthur Tappan, listed 88 affiliates in New York 
State. Within three years, that number had expanded to 369. In fact, by 1839, many 
counties in Massachusetts and several counties in New York and Ohio had more 
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antislavery societies than all of Rhode Island, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Michigan.40 
In spite of their still relatively small numbers, the abolitionists were highly 
effective political agitators who were determined to influence northern public opinion. 
They attacked the Slave Power, and its northern accomplices, at every turn, and as a 
result, their popularity grew alongside northern belief in the conspiracy. In New York, for 
instance, antislavery men “gradually and almost unobserved gained strength from year to 
year, as some new event would focus the attention of the country upon what was deemed 
the ever-widening ambition and arrogance of the Southern leaders.”41 The establishment 
of the gag rule by Congress was one such event. Ironically, the gag rule, which sought to 
silence the abolitionists by suppressing their right to petition, actually helped invigorate 
and legitimize the movement. According to Congressman Galusha Grow of Ohio, 
“Previous to the passage of the [gag] rule, Abolitionism was but a sentiment, and a mere 
sentiment is not a sufficient basis for a formidable political organization. But when great 
principles of constitutional rights are violated, . . . enduring political organizations [may 
be created].”42  
Shrewdly, the abolitionists capitalized on the controversy over the gag rule and 
rebranded themselves as “the defenders of white liberties as well as the champions of the 
hapless slaves.”43 Prefiguring the debate over free-soil, southern politicians, in contrast, 
were depicted as the enemies of a free northern society in which constitutional freedoms 
(of white men, that is), including the right of petition, were protected and cherished. 
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Disgust and contempt were especially reserved for northern Democrats, whom the 
abolitionist press accused of betraying their own constituencies by voting with the South. 
For instance, referring to the “self-styled Democratic party,” one abolitionist charged, 
“Towards southern men and southern measures – towards southern mobs and southern 
misrule – towards southern arrogance and southern ambition – towards southern 
institutions and southern iniquity – the party we oppose has displayed the most pitiable 
subserviency, and the most degrading deference.”44 The American Anti-Slavery Society, 
in another example, listed on its “Roll of Infamy” the 53 “northern serviles” – most of 
them Van Burenites – who voted with the Slave Power to renew the gag rule.45  
According to abolitionist rhetoric, the Slave Power, with the help of its northern 
lackeys, was subverting the Constitution in order to defend their “peculiar institution.” 
The “infamous ‘gag rule,’” declared the American Anti-Slavery Society, was “a violation 
of the principles of republicanism, a trampling on the right of petition, and a complete 
abrogation of a sacred right guaranteed to us by the Constitution.”46 And though most 
northerners remained indifferent to the plight of southern slaves, and indeed openly 
hostile to free blacks, they refused to stand for such a blatant attack on their rights, as the 
gag rule was portrayed. As a result of the gag, and other alleged affronts, the North was 
becoming increasingly incensed by the gall of southern politicians and their northern 
underlings. Northern congressmen, in turn, were forced to pay heed to their constituents’ 
opinions, which helps explains the radical shift in northern Democratic voting that 
occurred in the early 1840s. According to Foner, northern Democrats began to vote 
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against the gag because “they wanted to end the continuing controversy over the rule, 
which was helping to swell the ranks of antislavery men in their districts.”47 And in 
Richards’ assessment, “By this time the Van Burenites had concluded the gag would cost 
them votes on Election Day.”48 By the 1840s, the abolitionists, as a political force, could 
no longer be ignored in many sections of the North. Any politician, of either party, who 
disregarded them did so at his own peril.  
The growth of abolitionism in the North precipitated the emergence of the Liberty 
Party, which was founded in New York in 1839. Initially more religious than political, 
the party was transformed under the pragmatic leadership of Salmon P. Chase, who 
joined the organization in 1841. According to Foner, “He realized that to win votes, the 
Liberty party would have to speak in political terms to the northern electorate and 
propose a program more precise than an abstract commitment to abolition.”49 Chase, a 
lawyer by trade, understood that federal interference with slavery in the states was 
unconstitutional, therefore, he developed a gradualist political approach to challenge 
slavery in the areas under federal jurisdiction – the District of Columbia, the territories, 
the interstate slave trade, and the fugitive slave law.50 Although abolition remained the 
party’s ultimate goal, Chase wisely sought to shed the stigma of fanaticism associated 
with abolition to win over more mainstream supporters. In order to accomplish this, 
Chase deliberately stressed the distinction between moral abolition and political 
antislavery, which was the central aim of the Liberty Party. While abolition stubbornly 
and unrealistically demanded the immediate end to slavery everywhere in the United 
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States (primarily on religious grounds), antislavery aimed to constitutionally challenge 
the institution where it could and sought to divorce the federal government from slavery 
by defeating the Slave Power that controlled it.51  
Although it was a legitimate political party, in that a slate of candidates ran for 
office under its banner, the Liberty movement might more accurately be described as a 
pressure group because, like most third parties, it was essentially organized around a 
single issue.52 The party’s basic objective and strategy was not to supplant, or even really 
compete with, either of the major parties in the North, but rather to secure the balance of 
power between them at elections. If they could do this, they believed, they could then 
force at least one of the major parties to adopt their antislavery policies, if only to win 
elections.53 By the early 1840s, in the key northern states of Ohio and New York, the 
Liberty Party had effectually attained the balance of power.54 With the presidential 
election of 1844 approaching, the Van Buren men were surely aware of these 
developments.  
In addition to steering many northerners toward antislavery, the Liberty Party 
deserves much of the credit for popularizing the idea of the Slave Power and turning it 
into an effective political symbol, or bogeyman, in the North. “During the 1840’s the 
Slave Power idea became a standard part of Liberty party rhetoric,” writes Foner. “As the 
issue of slavery extension emerged, the idea of a slaveholders’ conspiracy became more 
and more common in anti-slavery talk. . . . And, as anti-slavery leaders realized how 
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effective a political symbol the Slave Power could be, they intentionally stressed its evils 
in their speeches and platforms.”55 Furthermore, the party leadership was determined to 
exploit the idea of the Slave Power in order to energize the people of the North. As party 
leader Joshua Leavitt revealingly wrote to Chase, “I believe now there is a general 
preparation in the minds of the people to look to ‘overthrow the Slave Power’ as the 
ultimate result of our movement. I am struck by the facility with which this word has 
come into use in the documents of both Democrats and Whigs.” He advised, “We must 
make the most of that word. . . . [The] incessant use of the term will do much to open the 
eyes and arouse the energies of the people.”56 The controversy over the annexation of 
Texas and the Mexican War would certainly arouse the energies of the people and 
demonstrate just how effective the Slave Power thesis could be.  
 
 
III. The Battle over Texas and the Election of 1844 
In order to understand the origins of the Wilmot Proviso, it is necessary to examine the 
bitter sectional debate over the annexation of Texas which took place a few years before. 
According to Chaplain W. Morrison, the Texas controversy “precipitated a sectional 
clash over the extension of slave territory, [and was] a sort of dress rehearsal for the later 
Wilmot Proviso.”57 Texas, the northeastern-most state of Mexico, had long been coveted 
by American expansionists, especially southerners, who viewed its acquisition as part of 
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the young nation’s “Manifest Destiny.”58 In 1823, the government of newly independent 
Mexico began to encourage migration into the thinly populated province by offering 
colonists land for just 10 cents an acre and exemption from paying taxes for seven 
years.59 The idea was to create a buffer zone between Mexico’s interior and the United 
States, however, the plan completely backfired. A flood of land-hungry Americans from 
the southern and western states poured in, bringing large numbers of slaves with them. 
Before long, Anglo-Americans outnumbered Mexicans three to one, much to the dismay 
of Mexico City. In 1829, Mexico abolished slavery in an effort to discourage further 
American immigration, and in 1830, the government banned American immigration 
outright. The Mexican government, however, was much too weak to enforce these laws, 
so slavery remained the order of the day as thousands of Americans continued to enter 
Texas with their human “chattel.” 60    
 After General Santa Anna seized control of the government and made himself 
dictator in 1834, several provinces, including Texas, revolted the following year.  
While many Americans sympathized with the Texan struggle for independence, the 
abolitionists saw the rebellion for what it really was – an effort to protect slavery. The 
Liberator, for instance, proclaimed, “We regard the conduct of the Texians in the light of 
a rebellion, and BELIEVE THEIR OBJECT IS TO ESTABLISH AND PERPETUATE 
SLAVERY AND EXTEND THE SLAVE-TRADE. . . . [The] friends of humanity and 
true liberty are called upon to expose the iniquitous schemes that are carried on in that 
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country under the pretence of ‘a struggle for liberty against cruel oppression.’”61 In a 
widely circulated pamphlet, abolitionist Benjamin Lundy wrote, “the immediate cause 
and leading object of this conflict originated in a settled design, among the slaveholders 
of this country, (with land-speculators and slave-traders,) to wrest the large and valuable 
territory of Texas from the Mexican republic, in order to re-establish the SYSTEM OF 
SLAVERY; to open a vast and profitable SLAVE-MARKET therein; and, ultimately, to 
annex it to the United States.”62 Indeed, much of Lundy’s analysis, including his 
annexation prediction, turned out to be correct. After defeating Mexico, Texas first 
appealed to the United States to recognize its independence, and later, to annex it. 
After President Van Buren declined to consider annexation because of its 
association with slavery – an issue he preferred to avoid – the question fell to his 
successor (once removed), the slaveholding Virginian John Tyler. President Tyler, known 
to his many opponents as the “constitutional fact” because of the circumstances that put 
him in the White House, made the annexation of Texas his number one priority.63 Having 
already been repudiated by his own Whig Party, he had hoped that acquiring Texas 
would make him popular enough to seek reelection as a third party candidate, or better 
yet, as a Democrat in 1844. Most of the negotiations with the Lone Star Republic were 
made by Tyler’s Secretary of State Abel Upshur, who was also a slaveholder. However, 
after Upshur was killed in a freak accident onboard a battleship, the job was left to his 
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replacement, the proslavery zealot, John C. Calhoun.64 In April 1844, Calhoun presented 
a treaty to the Senate to admit Texas to the Union. Inexplicably, he attached to the treaty 
a copy of a letter he had written to the British ambassador Sir Richard Pakenham in 
which he “based the case for annexation on the need to protect and preserve the 
institution of slavery.”65 An outraged northern public took the letter, which was soon 
leaked to press, as absolute proof of a Slave Power conspiracy.  
Thanks to bipartisan northern opposition, however, Calhoun’s treaty was defeated 
in the Senate. But events surrounding the presidential election of 1844 would give it new 
life. Within four days of the publication of the Pakenham letter, the leading Whig 
presidential candidate Henry Clay announced his opposition to annexation, and the next 
day the presumptive Democratic nominee Martin Van Buren followed suit.66 In a widely 
published open letter, Van Buren wrote that, domestically and abroad, immediate 
annexation would “do us more real lasting injury as a nation than the acquisition of such 
a territory, valuable as it undoubtedly is, could possibly repair.”67 While his position 
undoubtedly pleased Van Buren loyalists in the Northeast and Midwest, it infuriated 
annexationist Democrats in the southern and western states. These disgruntled 
Democrats, however, would have the last word at the upcoming convention in Baltimore.  
When the Democrats assembled in Baltimore in May to select their party’s 
presidential candidate, a majority of the delegates arrived pledged to support Van Buren. 
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However, the southern and western pro-Texas lobby pushed through the previously 
mentioned two-thirds rule in order to block his nomination.68 Apparently “the northern 
man with southern principles,” as Van Buren was dubbed by his northern Whig 
opponents, was no longer considered a true friend of the South. In fact, on the first ballot, 
Van Buren failed to get more than a handful of votes from below the Mason-Dixon 
Line.69 After a prolonged deadlock, in which neither Van Buren nor his main rival Lewis 
Cass of Michigan were able to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority, the party 
nominated James K. Polk, a Tennessee slaveholder and an enthusiastic expansionist. In 
effort to appease the embittered Van Burenites, the nomination for vice president was 
offered to Van Buren’s protégé, Senator Silas Wright of New York, but after he refused 
it, the position was given to George M. Dallas of Pennsylvania. The convention also 
adopted resolutions in favor of the annexation of Texas as well as “all of Oregon” in 
order to satisfy northern Democrats. Thus, the “Re-annexation of Texas and the Re-
occupation of Oregon” became dual planks in the party’s platform.70  
The Van Burenites couldn’t help but feel betrayed by what had transpired in 
Baltimore. According to Morgan Dix, the son of New York Senator John A. Dix, “It was 
spoken of as a magnanimous sacrifice on their part. It was a sacrifice indeed, and one of 
those which call for many more in sequence.”71Although the Van Burenites vowed to 
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support Polk in the upcoming election, many found it hard to reconcile their own 
feelings, as well as those of their constituents, with the Texas plank of the Democratic 
platform. The situation was especially complicated in Van Buren’s home state of New 
York after the release of the “Secret Circular,” a private letter drafted by several leading 
Van Buren men, including William Cullen Bryant of the Evening Post, and quietly sent to 
a select group of sympathetic New York politicians, among them Preston King.72 The 
circular regretted the nomination of Mr. Polk and strongly denounced the resolution on 
Texas as “abhorrent to the opinions and feelings of a great majority of Northern 
freemen.”73 In the end, they concluded that “the best policy would be to support Polk, 
but, at the same time, to work for the nomination and election of congressmen who would 
oppose ‘the new and untenable doctrines’ of the annexation resolutions.”74  
 After the Secret Circular was leaked to the press, it was strongly censured by the 
conservative wing of the New York Democracy as “foul Abolition treason” and as 
“federalism [i.e., Whigism] under the guise of Democracy.”75 Soon after, the men behind 
the Secret Circular published a joint letter, addressed to “the Democratic-Republican 
Electors of the State of New York,” in the Evening Post in order to clarify their position. 
This time, the letter made it obvious that its authors opposed annexation, above all, 
because it would increase the political influence of the southern slave states. “A citizen of 
Mississippi with five slaves has virtually as many votes as four citizens of New York,” it 
argued. “If Texas ever comes into this Union, no one of its citizens shall have, with our 
																																								 																				
72 Donovan, Barnburners, 85. 
73 Quoted in Parke Godwin, A Biography of William Cullen Bryant, With Extracts from His Private 
Correspondence, Vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1883), 416. The Secret Circular is reprinted in its 
entirety in ibid., 416-17. Note: The term “freemen” here means northern white men. 
74 Donovan, Barnburners, 85-86. 
75 Quoted in Godwin, W.C. Bryant, 417. 
	26 
	
consent, more power than a citizen of our own State.” Furthermore, it claimed that 
“annexation is pressed upon us by a portion of the South as a new source of prosperity for 
the slave industry, and a new guarantee to their institutions.” The letter concluded by 
calling on New York’s electors to nominate “no man [for national or state Congress] who 
is committed to this scheme – this unwise, unjust, and un-American scheme of adding 
Texas to our dominions, without even a plausible pretext, with indecent haste, regardless 
of treaties and consequences, with its war, its debt, its slave institutions, and their 
preponderating political power.” 76 
Despite the obvious internal conflicts within the New York Democracy, by 
election time, the party was unified enough to deliver their state’s numerous electoral 
votes to Polk, thereby securing his national victory.77 The election in New York was 
extremely close, with Polk defeating Clay by only 5,000 votes.78 As predicted, the 
Liberty Party, whose candidate received nearly 16,000 votes, held the balance of power 
in the election.79 Although the Democratic ticket was successful in 1844, New York 
Democrats still had cause for concern. Whereas Polk defeated Clay by just 5,000 votes, 
Silas Wright was elected governor by a plurality of 10,033 votes. In fact, the very popular 
Wright was persuaded by the party leadership to run for governor (in place of the 
Democratic incumbent, William C. Bouck) in order to boost support for the southerner 
Polk and ensure the success of the national ticket – a move apparently justified by the 
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result.80 What disturbed the leadership, however, was the fact that in several key districts 
Polk ran several thousand votes behind Wright, and well behind the party’s congressional 
candidates.81 According to Jabez Hammond, “those democrats who thought it wrong to 
vote for Mr. Polk, on account of the Texas question, either declined voting for 
presidential electors, or voted the abolition ticket.”82 “The leadership concluded that the 
Texas controversy had given the balance of power to the abolitionists in dozens of 
communities, including ten upstate New York congressional districts, and hence the state 
was in danger of falling into Whig hands,” writes Richards. “They decided it was time to 
distance themselves from the South.”83 They would have occasion to do so almost 
immediately, as the question of Texas once again came before the House. 
 Because the annexation of Texas had been a major plank in the party’s platform, 
and because the election was considered by many a referendum on the issue, the Van 
Burenites were placed in a precarious position. As Richards explains it, “If they backed 
their southern colleagues, they were certain to be denounced as backing a Slave Power 
conspiracy. If they broke with the southern Democrats, they were equally certain to be 
denounced for betraying the party’s campaign promises.”84 While most northern 
Democrats chose the first option and switched their votes in favor of annexation, the Van 
Buren men conspicuously chose the latter. In fact, the Van Burenites, including some of 
the same men behind the upcoming Proviso, helped lead the opposition against 
annexation in Congress. And noticeably, their rhetoric increasingly reflected the 
antislavery and anti-southern sentiments of their constituencies. According to Jacob 
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Brinkerhoff, for instance, annexation “was a southern question, for the benefit of the 
South; for the strengthening of her institutions; for the promotion of her power; for her 
benefit, for the advancement of her influence.”85 Preston King asserted that the main 
issue was not the morality of slavery in the abstract, but “the increase and predominance 
of slavery, as a distinct and exacting power in the confederacy.”86 George Rathbun of 
upstate New York protested that the South was asking northern congressmen to “commit 
suicide on this floor,” and he “reminded his fellow northerners of the political demise of 
the northern doughfaces who had sold their votes to the South during the Missouri 
crisis.”87 
As demonstrated by Rathbun’s comments, the Van Burenites were well aware of 
the mood in their home districts and quite rightly feared the political consequences of 
voting for annexation. Silas Wright, for instance, remarked that “the Texas treaty is made 
upon a record which is sure to destroy any man from a free State who will go for it.”88 
King echoed this fear in a letter to Van Buren: “I believe the democratic party will fall in 
every free state except Illinois if the democratic party can be made responsible for 
legalizing slavery in the whole of Texas.”89 Perhaps the best illustration of the dilemma 
faced by the New Yorkers, in particular, comes from a letter written by Senator John 
Niles of Connecticut. 
 
Do you not forget that the democratic party there [in New York] is now in a 
minority and that public sentiment in that state has a strong infusion of the spirit 
of abolitionism. . . . The abolitionists are gaining in New York, and recruiting 
from the Democrats; and would you have our friends there give them a new and 
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powerful impulse? . . . Do you think the N. York members have no sagacity, no 
instinct to discover public sentiment in their districts? . . . [The South] will 
consent to no compromise, to reconcile the measure to the opinions or prejudices 
of the north, and make it more safe for the northern democrats to vote for it. . . . 
There have been enough northern democrats who have sacrificed themselves to 
southern interests and I do not wish to see anymore.90 
 
 
Van Burenite organs in the North echoed Hale’s opinion that northern Democrats 
had already conceded more than enough to their southern colleagues. For instance, the 
New York Evening Post insisted that southern demands had become intolerable and 
declared it was time that northern Democrats break their alliance with the South. 
Moreover, the editor denounced the doughfaces who helped the South revive the Texas 
treaty and, foreshadowing the Wilmot Proviso, called on northern Democrats to take a 
stand against the further extension of slavery. According to the Evening Post: 
 
This abortion [the treaty], rejected with contempt and disgust by the whole 
country, a few Northern Democrats are swaddling and nursing and trying to coax 
into life. Now, we say it with mere reference to the interests of the party – 
interests which no wise person can overlook – that any Northern Democrat who 
seeks to identify the party with the extension of slavery, and to make that the 
rallying question, is only fit for bedlam; and no greater political insanity can be 
imagined. Shall the young Democracy, in its heroic youth, stifle its ardent nature 
by so unnatural an alliance? Where slavery and slave representation exist under 
the constitution, let them exist. It is the bargain, it is the bond. But to extend these 
evils to another portion of the Western hemisphere, and, above all, to make this 
the rallying cry of the party, is evidently suicidal.91  
 
As revealed by the excerpt above, the Van Burenites were, in a sense, fighting for 
the soul of the Democratic Party. Because of rising antislavery and anti-southern 
sentiments in the North, northern Democrats would be trapped in an untenable political 
position as long as the party was dominated by southern members insisting on the 
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extension of slavery. Particularly in those sections where antislavery convictions were 
strongest, anyone deemed to have aided the South in spreading slavery would indeed be 
committing political suicide. When the Mexican War began just a few years later, the 
Proviso men would have certainly had this mind. 
Despite the best efforts of the opposition, the annexation of Texas was ultimately 
approved by the House and narrowly ratified by the Senate. Conspicuously, 27 Van 
Buren Democrats voted against annexation, including 13 members from New York.92 
“Among those in opposition were King, Rathbun, Brinkerhoff, and Hamlin – all of whom 
were to have a role in the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso.”93 Just five years before, 
southern Democrats could count on the automatic support of the Van Buren doughfaces, 
but no longer. In the wake of the Texas controversy, the Van Burenites’ divorce from the 
southern wing of the party was nearly complete. The Mexican War, and the movement 
that developed to oppose it, would shatter the alliance once and for all.  
 
IV. The Mexican War and the Antiwar Movement 
Considering the character of the debate over annexation, it is not surprising that many 
northerners would distrust the objects of the impending Mexican War. Remarkably, 
abolitionists, northern Whigs, and Van Burenites had found common ground and together 
denounced annexation as a southern scheme to acquire more slave territory. Although the 
South ultimately won the dispute over Texas, the antislavery forces had gained valuable 
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experience and would continue to keep their powder dry for the next battle against the 
Slave Power. 
Opponents of annexation had previously claimed that if Texas were admitted to 
the United States, it would mean almost certain war with Mexico. Henry Clay, for 
instance, had remarked during the presidential campaign that “annexation and war with 
Mexico are identical.”94 Van Buren had also warned of the probability of war, and was 
particularly distressed by the damaging effects he believed it would have on the 
Democratic Party. In an especially prescient letter, Van Buren wrote, “Too much care 
cannot be taken to save us from a war, in respect to which the opposition shall be able to 
charge us with plausibility, if not truth, that it is a war waged for the extension of 
slavery.” In the event of a war, northern Democrats would, Van Buren feared, “be driven 
to the sad alternative of turning their backs upon their friends [i.e., their southern 
colleagues], or of encountering political suicide with their eyes open.”95  
Of course, Mexico had never recognized the independence of Texas, therefore, it 
viewed annexation as an illegal and belligerent act by the United States. Shortly after 
Polk’s inauguration, Mexico severed diplomatic relations with its northern neighbor. 
Nevertheless, President Polk sent a diplomat named John Slidell on a secret mission to 
Mexico City with instructions to resolve the boundary dispute between Texas and Mexico 
and to buy the much coveted territory of Alta California. As Greenberg acknowledges, 
“Polk was putting on an excellent show of negotiating, but in fact everything about 
Slidell’s mission, from his title to his terms, was intended to incense the Mexicans and 
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ensure that diplomacy would fail.”96 Unsurprisingly, the Mexican government declined to 
receive Slidell, so Polk started making preparations for war, which had been his design 
all along. Since Mexico refused to sell California, the United States would simply take it 
by force of arms.  
In March 1846, on Polk’s orders, General Taylor’s forces crossed the Nueces 
River and marched through the disputed territory all the way to the Rio Grande, where 
they were met by Mexican troops.97 On April 24, a detachment of Mexican cavalry 
crossed the Rio Grande and engaged in a firefight with U.S. soldiers sent to meet them. 
Eleven Americans were killed in the skirmish, and although he didn’t know it yet, Polk 
had his excuse for war.98  
On May 9, Polk finally received word of the incident, and on May 11, he sent a 
message to Congress claiming that “Mexico has passed the boundary of the United 
States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon American soil.”99 
Therefore, he demanded not that Congress declare war, but rather recognize that a war 
already existed “by the act of Mexico.” A war bill providing for 50,000 volunteers and 
$10 million was quickly drawn up in the House and, with debate severely restricted, 
passed by a margin of 174 to 14, with numerous abstentions. Although many had their 
doubts about the president’s version of events, the potential charge of disloyalty was 
enough to pressure them into voting for the bill. All of the negative votes were cast by 
antislavery Whigs, including John Quincy Adams, who were afterwards reverently 
dubbed the “Immortal Fourteen” by peace activists. The following day, the measure 
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passed the Senate by a margin of 42 to 2, with several abstentions, including John C. 
Calhoun.100 
From the start, the abolitionist press strongly denounced the Mexican War as a 
war of conquest initiated by the Slave Power in order to extend the “peculiar institution.” 
In a letter published in the Liberator, William Lloyd Garrison wrote of the war, “It is a 
distinct, all-crushing pro-slavery movement.” “I am anxious that, to the final termination 
of hostilities,” he continued, “the Liberator should bear a steady, oft-repeated and faithful 
testimony against the Executive that provoked the Mexican war – against the Congress 
that sanctioned it – against the parties that encourage it – against every individual that 
does not protest against it.” Garrison called on all opponents of slavery to agitate and to 
make every effort to disrupt the execution of the war. “The enemies of slavery, therefore, 
should consider it to be the chief anti-slavery work which they are now specially called 
upon to do, to endeavor to paralyze the power of the government, that Mexico must be 
saved, and the overthrow of the Slave Power hastened.”101 Another abolitionist paper, the 
Liberty Standard, pondered, “What, then, must be the nature of a war begun confessedly, 
to strengthen the bands of oppression, and now waged with a fiendish spirit for the 
avowed purpose of extending the curse of slavery over territories, robbed, and to be 
robbed, from a weak, defenseless people! [?]”102  
The claim that the war was being waged in the interests of the South (i.e., for the 
acquisition of more slave territory) at the expense of the North was not far from the 
surface of most antiwar critiques. Furthermore, the abolitionists believed that the nation, 
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especially the northern public, had been duped into supporting the war by Slave Power 
deceptions and a duplicitous northern press. “And yet the game has been played so 
adroitly by southern hands, that all the people, north and south, are found supporting the 
war before they know it,” wrote the Liberty Standard. “And if one can judge by the 
ebullitions of partizan presses, the people of the free States are willing still to truckle and 
stoop to the slave power, and pour out their blood and their treasure to defend and 
strengthen it.”103 The Charter Oak, a paper published by the Connecticut Anti-Slavery 
Society, similarly denounced northern newspapers for fermenting the martial spirit 
among the populace. “The Democratic papers all unite in glorying over our disgraceful 
quarrel with Mexico – and some of the Whig papers echo their wicked nonsense, as if 
patriotism required a man to make a fool of himself, and a knave to boot.” Furthermore, 
the writer went on to encapsulate the crux of the antiwar stance in just a few sentences. 
“The truth is, a more inexcusable, base, iniquitous and cowardly war never was waged, 
than that in which our government has wickedly involved itself with Mexico,” the writer 
opined. “It is a war of aggression – it is a war of the strong against the weak – and, to 
crown the infamy of the thing, it is a war for the extension of slavery.”104 While 
abolitionists obviously challenged the war because of its association with slavery, they 
and other members of the opposition also feared it would establish a dangerous precedent 
in U.S. foreign policy. And as it turned out, they were right to be concerned. As a war of 
expansionist aggression against a neighboring nation and a sister republic, the Mexican 
War transformed the United States into an emerging imperial power and continues to 
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affect how the U.S. engages with the rest of the world.105 Whether a nation can be both a 
republic and an empire – without sacrificing the values of the former – remains disputed 
to this day.  
The idea that northern doughfaces, primarily Polk’s fellow Democrats, had once 
again sold out to their southern overlords was also a common theme of abolitionist 
antiwar rhetoric. “It would almost seem that the ‘doughfaces’ of Randolph’s day were 
noble men, compared with this generation in the North; for verily, there can be no act of 
debasement to which Southern masters will only deign to give them the crumbs which 
fall from their tables,” charged the Liberty Standard.106 “The Mexican war has developed 
a crouching spirit in the free States, that notwithstanding all the insults and injuries 
without number endured for scores of years, exhibits no signs of manhood, but for every 
little favor granted by Southern overseers, whispers, ‘We are but unprofitable 
servants.’”107 To the Proviso men, representing antislavery and anti-southern districts, 
these charges had to have been worrisome, especially in an election year.  
While writers and editors did their best to promote the antiwar spirit in print, 
opposition to the war was hardly confined to the pages of a few antislavery papers; it was 
vigorously expressed by the people themselves. Throughout the Northeast and the upper 
Midwest – the very sections represented by the Proviso men – thousands of antiwar 
activists answered Garrison’s call to “endeavor to paralyze the power of the government” 
to wage war against Mexico and to “overthrow the Slave Power.” According to John H. 
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Schroeder, “Meetings of local and state abolitionist societies in New York, Ohio, 
[Pennsylvania,] and New England became forums for antiwar speeches and resolutions. 
The pages of antislavery journals abounded with accounts of these meetings and with a 
steady stream of articles, editorials, atrocity stories, letters, and labored verse.”108 For 
instance, at one such meeting held in Boston, antiwar resolutions were offered that 
denounced the war as “notoriously waged for the purpose of strengthening, perpetuating 
and extending the traffic in slaves and souls of men” and as “a war of subjugation, and 
much more so to extend the withering curse of slavery, which is operating on the body 
politic like a cancer in the physical man.” Furthermore, those in attendance avowed that 
“it is the duty of friends of justice and humanity, and all who are opposed to human 
butchery, to do all that can rightfully be done to prevent enlistments, and to frustrate the 
purposes of the government, and to paralyze its bloody arm.” And finally, they affirmed 
that “this meeting protests against the act of our government, in their unrighteous attack 
and invasion of Mexico, and that we will sustain our Representatives, in voting against 
supplies for butchering our brethren.”109 As members of the Democratic majority, the 
Van Burenites couldn’t possibly vote against supplying the war. Indeed, only the most 
radical antislavery Whigs dared do so, and they were denounced by their Democratic 
opponents as apostates and traitors as a result.110 Thus, for the Van Burenites, the only 
way to appease antiwar activists was to somehow assure them that the extension of 
slavery was not the object of the war. 
In addition to the antislavery bastions of New England, there was a groundswell 
of popular protest against the war in various sections of the Northeast and upper 
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Midwest. In Ohio, for example, a meeting of the Western Anti-Slavery Society was 
attended by “not much, if any less than a thousand people, and [the turnout] increased in 
number as well as interest, to the very last.” “In the city I have seen larger, and perhaps as 
enthusiastic meetings, but in the country never, nor anything like it,” the correspondent 
remarked. “Every aisle was thronged, and large numbers waited outside at the windows.” 
Inside the meeting house, antiwar resolutions were proposed, a “thronging multitude 
voted upon them, and there was scarcely a dissenting voice. The anti-war pledge was 
adopted as a resolution, and signed by 400 persons.” While he conceded that “In some 
sections [of Ohio], the war spirit is rampant,” the correspondent happily reported that in 
other areas, “the drum of the recruiting officer beats in vain – the Democrats storm about 
it, but the miserable cowards have no idea of enlisting themselves; consequently, only 
three men out of three thousand have gone, and they are of the class that can be 
spared.”111 
At a meeting held in Wilmot’s home state of Pennsylvania, the Antislavery 
Society of Eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware resolved that “we view the 
war which this nation is waging against Mexico, as a war of aggression for the interests 
of the slave power, and the extension of the slave system; and that to give it countenance 
and encouragement is to fight against the cause of humanity and freedom.” Petitions 
addressed to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives were also drawn up and 
signed by those in attendance. One	implored Congress to “abolish slavery throughout the 
Union;” another, claiming that “no such union [between north and south] can exist, but 
the sacrifice of freedom to the supremacy of slavery,” called on Congress “to devise and 
propose without delay, some plan for the immediate peaceful dissolution of the American 
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Union.”112 Petitions of a similar nature were also sent to the Pennsylvania state 
legislature.113 The common abolitionist refrain that freedom was being sacrificed to “the 
supremacy of slavery” under the present political arrangement was based on two beliefs. 
First, abolitionists believed that in a country that allowed, or even promoted slavery, 
freedom could only exist in the abstract. Indeed, they considered every citizen of the 
Union an accomplice to slavery and, by extension, none of them truly free. Second, since 
the Slave Power controlled the government, the interests of slaveholders would always 
dictate policies that promoted slavery and undermined freedom. To antislavery peace 
activists, the Mexican War was further proof of this. 
The public disorder surrounding an antiwar meeting held in Syracuse, New York 
was indicative of the deep popular divisions caused by the Mexican War in many parts of 
the country. The “Friends of Peace” had rented the concert hall of a local hotel for the 
purpose of holding an antiwar meeting on the evening of June 18th, but when they 
arrived, they “found the room in the possession of a gang of bullies determined to 
transform it into a War meeting!” Forced by this pro-war mob to relocate, they withdrew 
to the Congregational Church, where a series of antiwar speeches were made and a list of 
resolutions presented. Among the resolutions was one which maintained that “true 
patriotism requires that the wrong doing of Governments should be denounced as boldly, 
and opposed, as strenuously, as the wrong doing of individuals; and that the treason most 
to be dreaded and abhorred is that which would urge on, or sustain a Government in the 
horrid work of human butchery.” Another resolution claimed that since “the object of the 
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present war is the extension and perpetuation of the accursed system of slavery, it 
becomes the solemn duty of all true friends of our country, and of human liberty, firmly 
to protest against it.” And another stated that “in our judgement, our success in this war 
now prosecuted for the conquest of Mexico, would be a greater calamity to our country 
and the world than our defeat . . . inasmuch as our success would establish in our 
Government the ascendency of slaveholders, and restore the accursed system of slavery 
to regions from which it had been expelled by the noble consistency of the Mexican 
Republicans.” “The Resolutions were then adopted,” the Tribune correspondent reports, 
“though some of the other sort [i.e., ‘the War men’] had left their own meeting to come 
over and vote against them, as well as to interrupt the speakers with hisses, groans, and 
vulgar exclamations.” Remarkably, “Not succeeding thus, a cannon was planted at the 
rear of the church and fired two or three times to disturb and annoy the meeting.” The 
New York Daily Tribune, a Whig newspaper opposed to the war, denounced the behavior 
of the pro-war rabble as “Loco-Foco ruffianism.”114 Loco-Foco, it should be noted, was a 
defamatory nickname for Democrats.  
Pacifist organizations, like the “Friends of Peace” and the American Peace 
Society, matched the zeal of the abolitionists in their denunciations of the Mexican War. 
Indeed, there was a large degree of overlap in ideology and membership between these 
two movements. William Lloyd Garrison, for instance, was one of the founders of the 
Non-Resistance Peace Society in addition to the better-known American Anti-Slavery 
Society.115 While pacifists objected to all wars on principle, they viewed the Mexican 
War as especially unjust and called on all true Christians to oppose it. According to the 
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American Peace Society, “the unjust and unnecessary war now waged with Mexico must 
be condemned, on religious principles, by every person pretending to the name of 
‘Christian,’” and that “it is their duty to give every moral opposition to it; for indifferent 
observation of a crime is a quiescent assent to it, and often proves a passive support.” 
Like their abolitionist allies, the pacifists also condemned the war on antislavery grounds. 
“Had it not been for the institution of American slavery, and a determination on the part 
of the friends of that institution to perpetuate its existence,” observed the Religious 
Recorder, “we [would have], without the least doubt, today been at peace with the nation 
we are now seeking to destroy.”116 
The American Peace Society entreated its members to “let this voice [of 
opposition] be heard so that it may reach our national legislature, and all the excited war-
makers of the country, and cause them to pause in their insane and vicious career.” 117 In 
turn, petitions poured into Congress and the Office of the President demanding “that an 
immediate stop be put to it [the war] by withdrawing our troops from Mexico, and 
offering to adjust all the difficulties between us by negotiation or reference.”118 
Thousands of copies of these petitions were sent to ministers throughout the country, and 
hundreds more were forwarded to a variety of newspapers for publication.119 The Society 
made special appeals to the “ministers of the gospel” to “lead the van of efforts for the 
restoration and continuance of peace,” and to “lift up their voices against the continuance 
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of this war.”120 From pulpits across the Northeast and upper Midwest, Christian preachers 
answered their call.121 
The mainstream press, on the other hand, was for the most part united in its 
enthusiastic support for the war, and did its best to stir up patriotic fervor and downplay 
the existence of popular opposition to the war. The abolitionists, who were from the start 
the most vocal opponents of the war, were a favorite target of Democratic newspapers, in 
particular. The Charleston Mercury, for instance, pronounced the “almost unanimous 
support of the country in the Mexican War” and claimed that, “With the trifling exception 
of the Abolitionists proper, the whole press has aided the Government.” 122  According to 
the New Orleans Commercial Times, the war’s motives “are perfectly intelligible and 
satisfactory to the entire country unless we may except a contemptible handful of 
traitorous fanatics about New England, who call themselves the champions of liberty.”123 
The New York Herald, a pro-expansionist Democratic paper, likewise observed that, 
“With the exception of this small faction – this small cloud of sheer niggerism – with its 
erroneous views, without common sense, not appreciating the spirit and destiny of this 
great republic – the rest of the country, in all directions, appears to be united in repelling 
the Mexicans, and in chasing Mexico herself, up to the very capital.”124		
Behind such efforts to marginalize abolitionist opposition was a clear desire to 
minimize the very real existence of antiwar sentiment in various sections of the nation.	
For example, the Herald elsewhere remarked that “to the pending war with Mexico there 
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is no opposition, except from a few miserable and insignificant abolitionists, who have 
long since lost all weight in the community, and whose factious carping passes almost 
unnoticed.” Although the antiwar abolitionists were dismissed as “insignificant” and 
“almost unnoticed,” the fact that the writer went to such lengths to discredit them reveals 
that the war, in reality, was not as popular as he’d have his audience believe. “The insane 
driveling of those visionaries,” he continued, “is so utterly unimportant and contemptible, 
that though they often verge on treason against the commonwealth, they only create pity 
for the mental aberrations of the writers.” The reader, however, was reassured that 
“Sensible men of both parties have united in cordial support of the war, and the measures 
of the administration.”125  
By and large, the Whig press initially provided reliable, if somewhat reluctant, 
support for the administration and its war effort. The Whig Party was well aware that its 
political predecessor, the Federalist Party, was ultimately destroyed by its opposition to 
the War of 1812, therefore, most Whig papers tended to come across just as patriotic as 
their Democratic competitors.126 In certain parts of the country, however, especially 
where antislavery sentiment was strongest, the Democrats had more to fear than “a few 
miserable and insignificant abolitionists.” In those states of the North in which 
antislavery Whigs and antislavery Democrats, including the Proviso men, were 
competing for votes, Whig papers consistently denounced Mr. Polk’s war and the 
northern Democrats who sustained it. For instance, according to Horace Greeley’s highly 
influential New York Daily Tribune, “The nation was unnecessarily and 
unconstitutionally hurried into a war” by the Polk administration. And for their part, 
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“Without having seen a single document or a particle of evidence on which to base their 
votes, the dominant party [i.e., the Democrats] got on their knees before the usurper of 
Congressional powers, and registered his edicts in blood of two sister Republics.”127 In a 
letter to the Tribune’s editor, one citizen remarked that in its dealings with Mexico, “there 
has been exhibited by the Administration a degree of imbecility and accumulative avarice 
unparalleled since the organization of the General Government!”128 “We know what the 
despotism of a majority is in this country,” wrote the Cincinnati Herald and Advertiser. 
“The Party that has the majority, is less amenable to public sentiment, less responsible in 
every way, than the One-Man Power in Europe.” The writer asserted, “We have seen 
what a mere cobweb the constitution is before the breath of such a Party. Give them a 
Standing Army; let it become inflamed with the lust of conquest, and where then are the 
safeguards of political liberty?”129 
Although the war was most frequently condemned by the northern Whig press as 
unconstitutional, and as unnecessarily provoked by the administration, it was also widely 
denounced as an aggressive war of conquest. Indeed, some of the Whig critiques of the 
war were so similar in character to those of the abolitionists that it was often difficult to 
differentiate between the two. Like the abolitionists, many Whig journalists and editors 
viewed the war as a Slave Power scheme to acquire more slave territory and thereby 
enhance southern power in government. For instance, rhetorically addressing its 
readership, the Weekly Ohio State Journal wrote, “It is for them [i.e., the northern public] 
to say whether the domination of slavery and the slave power shall be extended over a 
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vast extent of territory in the West and that Territory added to the Union in violation of 
the compact that binds the States together, in order to give away to the South in the 
counsels of the nation and fasten on the country a Southern policy.” Furthermore, the 
writer appealed to his readers to take a stand against the Slave Power and the objects of 
the war. “A free and virtuous people, who have hitherto prospered because they have 
been just, are to decide whether this war for conquest and plunder shall go on to the 
consummation designed,” he instructed. “It is for them to say whether a free soil shall be 
subsidized to extend the curse of Slavery and the pride of a Slaveholding aristocracy. The 
voice of the nation must be heard now, if at all.”130 The Van Burenites, it would seem, 
heard them loud and clear.  
Additionally, the Whig press took every opportunity to disparage northern 
Democrats, whom they depicted as subservient doughfaces for supporting a southern war 
to extend slavery. The Tribune, for instance, condemned the “responsible majority [i.e., 
the Democrats] which trembled before the dictation of the Southern slave representation, 
and which endorsed a protocol to sacrifice the national honor in the eyes of the civilized 
world.”131 By supporting a war for slave territory, the Weekly Ohio State Journal 
charged, “northern Locofocos, who have just been affecting to regret what they have 
done for the South, show themselves ready to do, without a why or wherefore.”132  
Remarkably, while they never wavered in their support for the war, even some 
Democratic newspapers joined the chorus of opposition against the extension of slavery 
that might result from it. For instance, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the leading 
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Democratic paper on the Western Reserve (the section of Ohio which had elected 
Brinkerhoff to Congress) proclaimed, “The West has but to say that no more slave 
territory shall be annexed to this Union, and the dark tide of slavery stayed. . . . It is time 
that the lovers of freedom should unite in opposing the common enemy [i.e., the Slave 
Power] by fixing bounds to their aggression.”133  
In many sections of the Northeast and upper Midwest, such was the public mood 
concerning the Mexican War in the summer of 1846. The conflict was widely condemned 
as a war of conquest being waged in the interests of slavery by thousands of abolitionists 
and pacifists, as well as the Whig opposition press. For their part in supporting the war, 
northern Democrats once again faced the familiar charge of selling out the interests of 
their constituents to the southern Slave Power. The Proviso men, therefore, had good 
reason for concern going into the midterm elections of 1846. The closely contested 
elections just two years before, the bitter fight over the annexation of Texas, and popular 
opposition to the war with Mexico all clearly demonstrated the extent of antislavery and 
anti-southern sentiment in their districts. Moreover, they would have been especially 
troubled by recent political developments in New Hampshire. 
 
V. The Example of New Hampshire 
For years, the Democratic Party of New Hampshire, much like that of New York, was 
extremely well organized and its leaders could rely on the strict discipline of its members. 
Since the Jackson era, the Granite State had been under the firm control of the 
Democrats, and until 1840, it had a perfect doughface voting record in Congress.134 In 
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fact, because of its unfailing support for southern measures, New Hampshire had 
acquired the reputation as the most doughface state in North, making it a frequent target 
for abolitionists and antislavery Whigs. For instance, one prominent abolitionist, referring 
to “the dreadful, hard-hearted” New Hampshire Democracy, charged, “[It] is no covered 
pit, but an open gulf. Its depravity is its boast. Its infamy is its highest glory. . . . It exults 
in the carnage it makes of humanity.”135  
By the 1840s, however, with the rise of antislavery sentiment and the related 
controversy over the gag rule and the annexation of Texas, the party leadership began to 
lose control of its own members of Congress. As Richards points out, “Especially 
irritating to the state’s doughface leaders was the behavior of John Parker Hale,” who 
was an important member of the Van Buren clique in the House. “He not only voted 
against annexation and spoke in Congress against the Texas bill, but he also sent a letter 
to his constituents, telling them that the Texas bill was a proslavery measure and asking 
them to act decisively as a ‘committee of the whole people.’” 136 For his alleged betrayal 
of the party, the leadership blocked Hale’s reelection in 1844 by running another 
Democrat in his place. After his excommunication from the official party, Hale formed 
an antislavery splinter party called the “Independent Democracy” in order to drive his 
former doughface chieftains from power.   
In March 1846, a coalition of Independent Democrats and antislavery Whigs 
successfully overthrew the Democratic Party in New Hampshire’s state elections.137 “The 
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northern Gibraltar of Slavery has been triumphantly scaled and conquered, – henceforth, 
we trust, to be used for the subversion, and not as hitherto for the protection, of the slave 
system,” exclaimed the Liberator.138 Hale’s organ, the Independent Democrat, declared, 
“It is with mingled feelings of joy and gratitude that we are able to announce the defeat of 
the Slavery Ticket. The people have spoken in a voice that must have a fearful meaning 
to the men who have undertaken to chain New-Hampshire to the car of oppression.” 
Furthermore, “We think the result indicates that the democratic freemen of New-
Hampshire are opposed to the proscriptive and tyrannical clique who for a few years 
assumed to rule, and in ruling have ruined the Democratic party. We think it indicates 
that New-Hampshire will not bow down to slavery.”139  
The political coup in New Hampshire sent shock waves through the northern 
Democracy. The people of New Hampshire had repudiated the entrenched Democratic 
“Slavery Ticket” and elected instead an antislavery coalition of Independent Democrats 
and Whigs. If such a sweeping reversal could take place in one of the best organized, 
most disciplined, and most doughface Democratic states, surely it could happen 
anywhere, including New York. This thought would not have been far from the minds of 
the Proviso men.  
Also instructive was John P. Hale’s fervent opposition to the Mexican War. 
Throughout the summer of 1846, Hale and his antislavery followers used the New 
Hampshire state legislature as a forum to attack the Polk administration and denounce the 
annexation of Texas and the Mexican War as schemes for the perpetuation of slavery.140 
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For example, in a widely published speech delivered in June 1846, Hale proclaimed, “this 
war in unparalleled in its infamy in modern history.” So certain was he of the rightness of 
his stance that he insisted, “when I am called from life, [if] I shall leave behind me a 
friend who may think me of importance enough to have a stone to mark my grave, I am 
entirely willing to let it be recorded upon it, ‘The man who denounced the Mexican 
war.’” In Hale’s evaluation, “The scheme of annexation, and the consequent war, are 
unequalled in their infamy, and will be so regarded by future ages.”141 
Hale also castigated his doughface colleagues for being in favor of “liberty [only] 
in the abstract.” But when called upon to prove his commitment to liberty, Hale charged, 
a New Hampshire Democrat “turns round and votes side by side with the member from 
South Carolina, just exactly, and just as far, as the slaveholder wishes him to vote. Do 
you not see that this man exerts far more influence in favor of slavery than the other?” 
asked Hale. “Is it not plain that his voice is ten thousand times for potent than any voice 
from the South, to perpetuate the accursed institution and rivet still more tightly the 
fetters on the thrall-bowed slave?”142 
Most relevant to the Proviso men was Hale’s prescient warning to northern 
politicians of both parties: “I stand here, not to speak of parties, but to men. Yet I will tell 
both the Whigs and the Democrats that if they attach themselves to the principles of 
slavery, there is no salvation for them. The car [of antislavery] which has started on its 
progress will crush to atoms, beneath its ponderous wheels, whatever obstacle may 
interfere.” Hale concluded by reminding his colleagues of the defeat they would face at 
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the polls if they failed to get onboard. “The democrats have already experienced a part of 
its effects [in the New Hampshire state elections], and let not the whigs flatter themselves 
that their efforts can avail to stop that onward progress which has ground their rivals to 
powder.”143 The Wilmot Proviso would put the Van Buren men squarely on the side of 
antislavery, and the antiwar movement deserves credit for steering them in that direction. 
 
VI. The Reintroduction of the Proviso and the Debate in the House 
By August 1846, the Proviso men would have certainly been aware of the rising tide of 
antislavery sentiment that had recently overwhelmed the New Hampshire Democracy. 
But most worrisome of all was the fact that their constituents vehemently opposed the 
present war with Mexico and were insistently agitating for its conclusion, largely on 
antislavery grounds. With only a few days left in session, and with what were sure to be 
closely contested midterm elections approaching, the Van Burenites calculated that they 
had to act now, or suffer the political consequences. As members of the dominant party, 
the Van Buren men were bound to support the war, but a gesture was required to reassure 
the antiwar faction of the electorate that the war was not being waged to spread slavery, 
and that they were not doughfaces beholden to the Slave Power. On August 8, when Polk 
made his request for two million dollars, they seized the moment to introduce the free-
soil amendment since known as the Wilmot Proviso. 
That the Proviso was an attempt by the Van Burenites to repudiate their 
connection to the Slave Power and to assure the antiwar bloc of the electorate that the war 
was not being waged in the interests of slavery is further supported by various statements 
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made after its reintroduction in Congress. Within weeks of the new session, an impatient 
King proposed a bill that would grant the president two million dollars to make peace 
with Mexico on the condition that slavery would be excluded from any territory acquired 
as a result. The House, however, refused to entertain the bill, therefore, it was not 
officially introduced.144 The next opportunity came on February 1, 1847, when Polk 
requested three million dollars to negotiate a peace treaty with Mexico. At the insistence 
of King and Wilmot, the Proviso was attached to the “Three Million Bill,” and a week 
later the fierce debate in the House began. 
In the debates concerning the Three Million Bill, as well as King’s earlier 
proposal, the Proviso men were keen to make two things clear: first, they firmly 
supported the war, and second, the Wilmot Proviso was not motivated by abolitionism.145 
However, in their defense of the free-soil amendment, the Proviso men appropriated 
some of the very same arguments made by antislavery critics of the war – namely that the 
South was conspiring to enhance its influence in the government through the extension of 
slavery. The Proviso, therefore, was needed to block the designs of the Slave Power (in 
spirit, if not in those exact words) in order to protect northern interests. For instance, 
speaking to the House in January 1847, King claimed that “The same interest which 
pertinaciously insisted upon extending slavery over Texas, still desires, I apprehend, its 
further extension.” Therefore, “The time has come when this Republic should declare by 
law that it will not be made an instrument to the extension of slavery on the continent of 
America.”146 According to Wilmot, “There is no question of abolition here, sir. It is a 
question whether the South shall be permitted, by aggression, by invasion of right, by 
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subduing free territory and planting slavery upon it, to wrest this territory to the 
accomplishment of its own sectional purposes and schemes? That is the question. And 
shall we of the North submit to it? Must we yield to this?”147 George Rathbun of New 
York echoed Wilmot’s claim that the extension of slavery was part of a coordinated 
scheme to enhance southern power. “The paramount object of its extension,” Rathbun 
asserted, “is political power.” And in language that could easily have been found in the 
pages of the Liberator, Rathbun declared:  
 
The objects of the slave States, I have said, is political power. It was the primary 
object in the formation of the Government under which we live. It has been from 
that day to this pursued with ceaseless energy and constantly increasing hopes of 
success. The time has come when this question must and will be decided. 
Independent of any considerations in regard to slavery in the abstract, the question 
whether the free States, embracing two-thirds of the freemen in this Union, shall 
be governed by the other one-third, and whether the two-thirds shall, by the act of 
their own Representatives, aid in transferring the power to the one-third, is the 
most momentous in its consequences to freedom of any ever presented to the 
Representatives of this great nation.148  
 
  
Without specifically alluding to opponents of the war, Brinkerhoff made it clear 
that the Proviso was motivated by the existence of antislavery sentiments in northern 
constituencies. As he rhetorically asked his southern colleagues in the House, “With what 
face, then, can southern men stand up here and call upon me or any other northern man, 
who is true to the sentiments his constituents are known to entertain, now, when they 
propose to turn free territory into slave territory, to recognize that line [the Missouri 
Compromise Line – 36˚, 30’ north latitude] west of the mountains?”149 Furthermore, 
Brinkerhoff lamented how northern Democrats and their constituents had suffered under 
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the southern dominated party arrangement and he entreated his fellow northern 
Democrats to unite around the Proviso or suffer defeat. 
 
But is not the success of the Democratic party in the free States a matter of some 
consideration? For years, southern gentlemen have been permitted to shape our 
party issues for their own convenience, and have been floating upon the current of 
popular sentiment at home, and at our expense. Are we to be required to father 
every wrong and outrage they may see proper to propose, and eternally to combat 
the inborn sentiments and native instincts of our people for their benefit? If we 
must descend to partisan considerations in connection with a question which 
ought to be and will prove to be above all party influence, I tell you, sir, the 
adoption of the ‘Wilmot proviso’ is the only way to save the Democratic party of 
the free States. Let the Democratic party of the free States, as a party, plant 
themselves in opposition to this principle, and they are destined to defeat and 
doomed to a position in the minority, from the confines of Iowa to the extremity 
of Maine. And this is not the worst of it, sir: they will deserve their fate.150 
 
 
The most explicit statement that the Proviso was meant to placate opponents of 
the war by assuring them that it was not being waged to spread slavery came from Martin 
Grover of New York. Responding to criticism in the House that the Proviso had been 
introduced at an inopportune time, Grover explained why it had been necessary. 
 
There was another consideration that rendered this time most fitting, in my 
judgement. It was this: throughout the entire northern portion of this country it 
was the topic of conversation and discussion, and of earnest investigation, what 
was to be the result of the war. The charge was iterated and reiterated that the 
war was undertaken on the part of the Administration, aided by the South, for the 
purpose of extending the area of slavery. . . . I wished a declaration on that subject 
for the purposes of satisfying the northern mind. . . .  Give us a declaratory 
resolution, supported on all sides in this House and in the other House, that you 
have no such design; that slavery is not to be extended in consequence of this war. 
. . . It was with a view to bring out a more thorough support of the war that I 
sought to have that proviso carried then. With that view my colleague presented 
his bill here. . . .  Satisfy the northern people – satisfy the people whom we 
represent – that we are not to extend the institution of slavery as a result of this 
war.151  
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Over the objections of the southern minority, the Three Million Bill, with the 
Proviso attached, passed the House by a 115 to 106 margin but once again stalled in the 
Senate. In the upper chamber, the Proviso was eventually deleted from the bill and the 
new version passed the Senate without a roll call. Returned to the House for approval, the 
Three Million Bill, minus the Proviso, eventually passed 115 to 82.152 The Wilmot 
Proviso was officially dead and buried, but its influence continued to live on. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political impact of the Wilmot Proviso has been well-documented by historians. 
According to Foner, “If any event in American history can be singled out as the 
beginning of a path which led almost inevitably to sectional controversy and civil war, it 
was the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso.”153 David Potter acknowledged that 
immediately after its introduction, and despite its death in the Senate, “the resolution had 
already begun to realign the structure of American politics” and that “the emergence of 
the sectionalism which almost destroyed the nation was symbolized by an amendment to 
an appropriation bill which was never enacted.”154  
The Wilmot Proviso made the principle of free-soil, which aimed to halt the 
expansion of slavery, the most significant and contentious political issue of the time. As a 
result of the Proviso, Avery Craven wrote, “The movement against slavery was taken out 
of the hands of those idealists who had begun and developed it, and given into the 
keeping of the politician. . . . Opposition to the extension of slavery began to replace 
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opposition to slavery per se.”155 The resulting congressional dispute over the extension of 
slavery would eventually lead to the splintering of the Second Party System along largely 
sectional lines, the birth of the Republican Party, and ultimately, the Civil War. As 
Morrison concluded, “Judging by the furor it created, the issue of slavery in the territories 
was one of the most significant in American history. Not only did it give birth to the only 
major political party to emerge in the United States since the time of Andrew Jackson 
[i.e., the Republican Party], the struggles it engendered culminated in southern secession 
and civil war.”156  
 The Wilmot Proviso, therefore, may be the most important piece of legislation 
never enacted. Unfortunately, historians have consistently overlooked the crucial role 
played by the antiwar movement in bringing the Proviso about. Although these dissidents 
were ultimately unsuccessful in stopping the Mexican War, their outspoken opposition 
and insistent agitation forced a handful of Van Buren Democrats to introduce a free-soil 
amendment in order to assure voters that the war was not being waged to spread slavery. 
And while the Proviso never managed to pass the Senate, its spirit lived on and it was 
eventually ratified, in slightly altered form, as the first section of the Thirteenth 
Amendment: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”157 For their part in all of this, thousands 
of nameless antiwar activists deserve some long overdue recognition.  
 
 
																																								 																				
155 Avery Craven, Coming of the Civil War, 225-26. 
156 Morrison, Democratic Politics, vii. 
157 United States Statutes at Large, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, 567. 
	55 
	
Bibliography 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
“American Anti-Slavery Society: Petitions. Thursday Morning, Nov 19.” Liberator, 
January 6, 1843. 
 
Beckwith, Geo. C. and Brown, William C. “Petitions Respecting the Mexican War.” 
Advocate of Peace, Vol. 7, No. 1/2 (Jan. and Feb., 1847): 16-20. 
 
Blanchard, J.P. “Mexican War.” The Advocate of Peace and Universal Brotherhood, Vol. 
1, No. 7 (July, 1847): 168-71. 
 
“A Chapter on the Mexican War.” Advocate of Peace, Vol. 7, No. 1/2 (Jan. and Feb. 
1847): 6-15. 
 
Cincinnati Weekly Herald and Philanthropist, June 3, 1846. 
 
“Domestic Party and Foreign War.” Charleston Mercury, July 1, 1846. 
 
“Extract of a Letter from Mr. Garrison.” Liberator, August 21, 1846. 
 
“Great Victory in New-Hampshire.” Liberator, March 20, 1846. 
 
Jay, William. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. Boston: 
Benjamin B. Mussey & Co., 1849. 
 
Lundy, Benjamin. The War in Texas: A Review of Facts and Circumstances. 
Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1836. 
 
“The Mexican War and its Probable Results on the Politics of this Country.” New York 
Herald, June 8, 1846. 
 
“The Mexican War: What shall be done to hasten its Termination?” Advocate of Peace, 
Vol. 7, No. 1/2 (Jan. and Feb., 1847): 20-21. 
 
New York Herald, August 11, 1846. 
 
“Ninth Annual Meeting of the Antislavery Society of Eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey 
and Delaware.” Liberator, August 21, 1846. 
 
“Northern Concessions.” Rochester Freeman. Reprinted in Liberator, January 31, 1840. 
 
“No Unity with the Mexican War.” Liberator, June 12, 1846. 
 
	56 
	
“The Objects of the Mexican War.” National Intelligencer. Reprinted in the Weekly Ohio 
State Journal, July 8, 1846.  
 
Parker, Theodore. A Sermon of War, Preached at the Melodeon, on Sunday, June 7, 
1846. 3rd ed. Boston: I.R. Butts, 1846. 
 
Pillsbury, Parker. “New-Hampshire Democracy and Massachusetts Whigism.” Herald of 
Freedom. Reprinted in Liberator, Mar 6, 1846. 
 
Pillsbury, Parker. “Our Cause in Ohio.” Liberator, July 3, 1846. 
 
“The Present Administration, How it obtained and how it seeks to prolong its Power.” 
New York Daily Tribune, June 1, 1846. 
 
“The Slave Power.” Boston Courier. Reprinted in Liberator, April 12, 1844. 
 
Stearns, Isaac. “The Democratic Party and Slavery.” Fall River Gazette. Reprinted in 
Liberator, May 20, 1842. 
 
“Texas.” Liberator, April 23, 1836. 
 
“The Traitor Hale.” Chronotype. Reprinted in Liberator, July 24, 1846. 
 
“The True Responsibility.” Auburn Journal and Advertiser, Sept. 16, 1846. 
 
U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 
 
U.S. Congress. United States Statutes at Large. 
 
The voice of New York! Proceedings of the Herkimer mass convention of Oct. 26, 1847, 
with the Speeches of the Hon. David Wilmot of Pa.; C.C. Cambreleng, John Van 
Buren, and others. Albany: Albany Atlas, 1847. 
 
Wilson, Henry. History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols. 
Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1872-1877. 
 
“The War.” Charter Oak. Reprinted in Liberator, June 12, 1846. 
 
“The War Declared.” New York Herald, 14 May, 1846. 
 
“War Declared!!!” Weekly Ohio State Journal, May 20, 1846.  
 
“A War for Conquest – The Design of the Administration – Another Extension of the 
Area of Slavery!” Weekly Ohio State Journal, July 15, 1846. 
 
“The War for Slavery.” Liberty Standard. Reprinted in Liberator, July 3, 1846. 
	57 
	
 
“The War Spirit Illustrated.” New York Daily Tribune, June 22, 1846.  
 
“The War with Mexico.” New York Daily Tribune, May 27, 1846. 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Benson, Lee. The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 
 
Craven, Avery Odelle. The Coming of the Civil War. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957. 
 
DeWitt, Charles J. “Crusading for Peace in Syracuse during the War with Mexico.” New 
York History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April, 1933): 100-112. 
 
Dix, Morgan, comp. Memoirs of John Adams Dix. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1883. 
 
Donovan, Herbert D.A. The Barnburners: A Study of the Internal Movements in the 
Political History of New York State and of the Resulting Changes in Political 
Affiliation, 1830-1852. New York: New York University Press, 1925. 
 
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party 
before the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
 
Foner, Eric. “Wilmot Proviso Revisited.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 56, No. 
2 (Sept., 1969): 262-279. 
 
Godwin, Parke. A Biography of William Cullen Bryant, With Extracts from His Private 
Correspondence. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1883 
 
Going, Charles Buxton. David Wilmot, Free-Soiler: A Biography of the Great Advocate 
of the Wilmot Proviso. Gloucester, Mass: P. Smith, 1966. 
 
Greenberg, Amy S. A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of 
Mexico. New York: Vintage, 2012. 
 
Hamlin, Charles Eugene. The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin. Cambridge, Mass: 
Riverside Press, 1899. 
 
Morrison, Chaplain W. Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso 
Controversy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967. 
 
	58 
	
Paul, James C.N. Rift in the Democracy. New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1961.  
 
Persinger, Clarke E. “The ‘Bargain of 1844’ as the Origin of the Wilmot Proviso.” The 
Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept., 1914): 137-146.  
 
Potter, David M. The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 
 
Richards, Leonard L. The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Richards, Leonard L. The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-
1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 
 
Schroeder, John H. Mr. Polk’s War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973. 
 
Smith, Theodore Clarke. The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1897. 
 
Stenberg, Richard R. “The Motivation behind the Wilmot Proviso.” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (March, 1932): 535-548. 
 
